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Security Information

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CFP

SUBJECT : PSB Staff Meeting, Wednesday, 1 April 1953

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1. At the outset of the meeting Mr. [REDACTED] noted that the specifics of Section II, paragraph 3.B. of PSB D-40, the CIA Annex to the plan on Stalin's death, were simply for the guidance of the working group.

2. Mr. Phillips of State Department advised the meeting that State had requested the PSB to supervise the preparation of a plan for specific measures to be taken in Iran predicated on certain assumed contingencies; that this would be in effect a contingency supplement to the Middle Eastern Plan. The formal proposal will be forwarded to CIA in due course.

3. With respect to the agenda for the meeting on April 2, 1953, first, it is to be noted that the time and place of the meeting have been changed to meet the convenience of General Smith who will go directly from the airport from an out-of-town trip to the meeting.

a. Item 1 of the agenda is a carry-over item.

b. Item 2: C. D. Jackson will simply report.

c. Item 3: It was the tenor of the discussion that D-7c is a good contingency plan and that the implementing operational plans are in good shape. However, among the implications to be discussed is the current preparation of appropriate courses of action with respect to the "sick and wounded" repatriation question. Mr. Phillips stated that State had cabled General Clark that he was to proceed to negotiate on good faith on an exploratory basis pending formulation of a U. S. position on underlying questions, such as the definition of a neutral nation. However, in the course of the discussion it was pointed out that we should undertake to consider the appropriate courses of action with respect to the corollary question of the repatriation of American prisoners, recognizing that some brain-washed and otherwise may refuse to repatriate and that certain hard-core Communists, representing converts or otherwise, will be among those repatriated. A collateral aspect of the negotiations appears to be

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that the initiative for the negotiations seems to come from Peiping with echoing endorsements from Moscow indicating possible shifts in the center of gravity on the Communist front which CIA might well exploit. Another related question is whether the current armistice efforts may not be the prelude to a gigantic peace offensive with economic implications (particularly on the American home front) as well as political.

d. Item 4 was put on the agenda at the instance of Mr. Dulles, representing a carry-over from last week; however, discussion indicated that C. D. Jackson is apparently of the opinion that NSC 86/1 does not give enough emphasis for the PY exploitation of defection.

e. Item 5 was put on the agenda at the instance of C. D. Jackson, with the underlying purpose of discussing the preparation of a bill of particulars for the next Assembly. This is in line with Mr. Lodge's thinking that the UN is the most effective medium for PW that we have and that at the next Assembly he would like to move from the defensive to the offensive and that he would like 8 or 9 underlying items to prosecute this offensive.

f. With respect to item 6 as to which the DCI has already taken a position as indicated by the attached memo, the only comment is that Mr. Phillips would have preferred that in lieu of the word, "approved," in the last paragraph that the word, "endorsed," be substituted.

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